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Using data from a 1988 survey of business school graduates, the authors 
analyze gender differentials in earnings by form of pay-total pay, base pay, 
and contingent pay-with controls for human capital, occupation,job level, 
and individual characteristics. The results indicate that within narrowly 
defined occupations and jobs, most of the unexplained difference in total 
pay between the men and women in the sample was due to gender differ- 
ences in the portion of pay that was contingent on job performance. The 
greater importance of contingent pay in the earnings of the men than of the 
women may reflect differential treatment of men and women by firms, 
gender differences in performance, gender differences in risk preferences, 
or some other sorting mechanism. 
M ost attempts to explain the gap in pay 
between men and women have fo- 
cused on sets of explanatory variables in- 
cluded in wage equations. Typically, an- 
nual earnings or hourly wages are regressed 
on human capital and other productivity- 
related measures of the job and individual. 
These variables account for part but not all 
of the gender-pay gap. The unexplained 
portion of the pay gap is often interpreted 
as the effect of market discrimination. Since 
it is possible that the failure of these regres- 
sions to explain all of the pay gap is due to 
omitted productivity-related variables, how- 
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ever, researchers are constantly searching 
for better measures of productivity. So far, 
better measures of the explanatory vari- 
ables have not significantly reduced the 
unexplained portion of the pay gap. 
In this paper we attempt to move toward 
an understanding of the causes of the unex- 
plained portion of the gender-pay gap by 
exploring a different dimension of the gap. 
Rather than simply trying to account for 
the gender difference in pay, we analyze 
how the pay gap varies by type of pay. The 
data set we use, drawn from a 1988 survey of 
business school graduates, includes mea- 
sures of individuals' base pay and pay con- 
tingent on job performance. We test 
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the results will be available after May 1995 for pur- 
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whether the unexplained portion of the 
pay gap varies between these two types of 
pay. The processes and managerial prac- 
tices that determine base pay are very dif- 
ferent from those that are used to deter- 
mine performance-contingent pay. Because 
of these differences, we argue that under- 
standing how the pay gap and the unex- 
plained portion of the gap are distributed 
between these two forms of pay is poten- 
tially useful for identifying or narrowing 
the possible causes of the pay gap. 
Research on the Gender-Pay Gap 
Studies of why men earn, on average, 
significantly more than women continue to 
find that a large percentage of the differ- 
ences in earnings and wages cannot be 
explained by differences in human capital, 
demographic characteristics, or firm char- 
acteristics. Even after controlling for broad 
occupational categories, approximately 
50% of the earnings differential cannot be 
accounted for by differences in endowments 
between men and women. Since measures 
that allow a comparison of productivity 
across workers,jobs, occupations, and firms 
are not available, the approach used in 
almost all attempts to explain the "unex- 
plained" portion of the pay gap has been to 
try to obtain marginally better proxies for 
productivity. The quality of education, ac- 
tual labor market experience, interruptions 
in labor market experience, and firm ten- 
ure, for example, have been included in 
recent studies of the pay gap. Measures of 
production in the household have also been 
included in earnings models. Responding 
to the argument by Becker (1985) that 
gender differences in household responsi- 
bilities may account for part of the pay gap, 
Hersch (1991), for example, used a new 
data set that included measures of the in- 
tensity of household and child care duties. 
She found that these factors, and specific 
job characteristics, added very little to the 
explanation of the pay gap. 
Only when control variables for detailed 
occupational category or the job are in- 
cluded in the estimates of the gender-pay 
gap does the unexplained portion of the 
gap decline significantly. Reviews of the 
literature show convincingly that most of 
the gender gap in pay, holding constant the 
traditional measures of human capital, oc- 
curs across occupations. Furthermore, 
nearly all of the relatively small difference 
in pay that exists within narrowly defined 
jobs and occupations occurs across firms 
(Blau 1977; Groshen 1991). Studies that 
look at pay differences within jobs, within 
firms, find little or no gender difference in 
pay. Gerhart (1990), for example, found 
that when human capital and other rel- 
evant factors were controlled for, the fe- 
male/male pay ratio within jobs in a single 
firm was between .95 and .98. We know 
from the existing research, therefore, that 
nearly all of the difference in pay between 
men and women is due to women being 
disproportionately represented in lower- 
paying occupations and in lower-paying 
firms within occupations. This conclusion 
is supported by reviews of recent studies of 
the gender-earnings gap (for example, Cain 
1986; Blau and Ferber 1987a; Gunderson 
1989). 
The extent to which market discrimina- 
tion is or is not a cause of the differences in 
mobility across jobs and in the occupa- 
tional distribution between men and women 
cannot be inferred from these studies. Al- 
though the findings indicate that much of 
the gender difference in pay occurs across 
occupations and jobs, Blau and Ferber 
(1987a, 1987b) pointed out that when con- 
trols such as occupation orjob are included 
in the estimate of the wage equation, the 
gender-pay gap tends to be underestimated. 
This underestimation occurs because the 
choice ofjob or occupation has likely been 
influenced by market discrimination. If 
the rate of return on educational invest- 
ments in engineering is lower for women 
than for men because of market discrimi- 
nation against female engineers, for ex- 
ample, then women will invest less than 
men in this type of education. In this case, 
the "choice" of women not to go into engi- 
neering is partly the result of market dis- 
crimination. At best, a lower bound esti- 
mate of the effects of discrimination is ob- 
tained when variables that may be influ- 
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enced by discrimination through feedback 
effects are included in the analysis. 
To better understand the causes of the 
pay gap, and not just the size of the gap, it 
is necessary to understand how the choices 
of occupations and firms differ between 
men and women, how firms' recruitment, 
selection, promotion, and pay determina- 
tion practices vary across jobs, and how 
these practices vary across firms. If market 
discrimination is a significant factor in the 
segregation of women acrossjobs or across 
firms, then these practices are the mecha- 
nisms through which discrimination and 
the related feedback effects occur. 
In this study we ask whether or not, within 
narrowly defined occupations or jobs, the 
gender-pay gap varies with the form of pay. 
Is the level of pay the only difference be- 
tween jobs in high-paying firms employing 
men andjobs in lower-paying firms employ- 
ing women? One characteristic that nearly 
all of the studies of the pay gap have in 
common is their use of the level of hourly 
wages or earnings as the dependent vari- 
able. Although there is a growing body of 
empirical literature focusing on compensa- 
tion and the incentive effects of various 
forms of pay (for example, Lazear 1986; 
Abowd 1990; Brown 1990; Kahn and Sherer 
1990), only one attempt has been made to 
test whether the gender-pay differential 
varies across different forms of pay. This 
fact is partly due to the nature of the data 
sets that are regularly analyzed for explana- 
tions of the gender-pay differential. Most, 
if not all, large public data sets provide 
measures of total earnings or hourly wages, 
but they do not provide the information 
necessary to distinguish among the forms 
of pay. 
The one study that does provide some 
information on differences in the form of 
pay is Goldin (1986). Using data from 1890 
to 1940 for manufacturing and clericaljobs, 
Goldin found that women were more likely 
than men to be paid piece rates. This 
finding is consistent with a model in which 
workers with high turnover rates are sorted 
into jobs or occupations with piece rates as 
opposed to time rate methods of pay deter- 
mination. Goldin's model shows that this 
sorting reduced monitoring costs associ- 
ated with higher turnover rates. 
The analysis in this paper uses data from 
a survey in which respondents reported 
their total annual pay, their base pay, and 
the part of their total pay that was contin- 
gent on their job performance. Examples 
of contingent pay are sales commissions 
and performance bonuses. Using this data 
set, we estimate the gender gap in total pay, 
base pay, and contingent pay. We attempt 
to answer the simple question: does the 
unexplained portion of the gender gap in 
total pay, withinjobs, vary between base pay 
and contingent pay? 
Base Pay and Contingent Pay 
The important respect in which this pa- 
per departs from previous studies is our 
disaggregation of the dependent variable, 
total pay, by form of pay. Total pay equals 
the sum of base pay and contingent pay. 
Base pay is the part of the total salary or pay 
that does not depend in a given year on the 
individual's job performance. Base pay is 
determined largely by the level of an 
individual's job in the firm's hierarchy. 
Changes in base pay are determined by 
year-to-year adjustments from merit pay 
awards and from promotions (demotions) 
to higher (lower) job levels. Merit pay 
adjustments are based on a supervisor's 
performance evaluation of the individual 
during a given period of time; they become 
a permanent part of the base pay beginning 
in the next pay period. Base pay, therefore, 
varies with job performance over time, but 
not during a given pay period. Although 
merit pay adjustments account for the vari- 
ance in base pay within a specific job level 
in a given firm, most of the variance in base 
pay reflects differences among jobs in their 
levels in the hierarchy. 
Contingent pay awards such as bonuses, 
commissions, and profit and gain sharing 
awards, on the other hand, depend prima- 
rily on the individual'sjob performance, or 
the performance of a group in the case of 
gain sharing and profit sharing, during a 
given period of time. When the individual 
(or the individual's group) achieves a pre- 
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specified performance standard, he or she 
receives a pre-specified pay award. Unlike 
merit pay adjustments, these pay awards do 
not become part of the base pay and are 
paid in subsequent time periods only if the 
individual (or group) continues to achieve 
the performance standard. All else equal, 
as contingent pay increases as a percentage 
of total pay, the individual's risk of short- 
run variations in pay as a result of variations 
in his or herjob performance also increases. 
This difference between base pay and 
contingent pay allows for a unique test of 
the extent to which the gender-pay gap 
varies with the amount of risk in pay that is 
borne by the individual. If firms discrimi- 
nate against women because of a priori ex- 
pectations that women are more likely than 
men to leave the firm during any given time 
period for family or other non-job-related 
reasons, then firms may attempt to force 
women to bear more of the risk for short- 
run variations in their job performance. 
This relationship would be consistent with 
the findings of Goldin (1986). The ex- 
pected relationship between the gender- 
pay gap and the form of pay, however, is not 
clear. Systematic differences in risk prefer- 
ences between men and women, for ex- 
ample, could cause women to select into 
jobs and firms with less pay risk than the 
jobs and firms selected by men, or vice 
versa. Subich et al. (1989), based on a study 
of college juniors and seniors who were 
about to enter the labor market, found that 
women were less likely to take risks in their 
occupation andjob choices than were men. 
Based on their review of the literature, they 
also provided a substantial amount of evi- 
dence thatwomen are more risk-averse than 
men in their behavior in the labor market 
and in other activities. 
The purpose of this study is not to esti- 
mate the effects of discrimination. We 
attempt, instead, to estimate the extent to 
which the unexplained portion of the pay 
gap varies between base pay and contin- 
gent pay. Since the base pay/contingent 
pay mix is likely to vary with the level of the 
job in the firm, we hold constant the job 
level by including controls for job mobility 
and access that may result from choices and 
abilities of individuals, barriers to job mo- 
bility confronting women, feedback effects 
from such discrimination, or some combi- 
nation of these factors. Controlling for 
these endogenous factors is likely to result 
in underestimation of the effects of dis- 
crimination. Once we control for the job 
level, however, we will be able compare the 
remaining unexplained portion of the pay 
gap in base pay with the unexplained por- 
tion in contingent pay. If the gender-pay 
gap does not vary by form of pay, then we 
would expect, controlling for the job level, 
that the unexplained percentage of the gap 
would be the same for base pay and contin- 
gent pay. 
The Data 
The data analyzed in this paper come 
from a survey of business school graduates 
of two large state universities. This data set 
was originally collected by George Dreher 
and Ronald Ash for the purpose of studying 
gender differences in mentoring. The re- 
sults of that study are reported in Dreher 
and Ash (1990). The data set was collected 
in 1988 through a mail survey of 1,000 
graduates from the MBA and undergradu- 
ate classes of 1978 and 1983. The sample 
was drawn to generate an approximately 
equal number of graduates by school, year, 
gender, and degree. 440 survey forms were 
returned.' For purposes of the current 
study we did not include the 48 respon- 
dents who reported working part-time (less 
than 35 hours per week) or the 28 individu- 
als who were self-employed. Of the remain- 
ing 364 responses, there are 312 usable 
observations. There are 168 men and 144 
women in the sample. 
Given the population surveyed, several 
sources of variation in pay are eliminated 
(or reduced) in the data set. Variances in 
quantity and quality of education, length of 
work experience, and occupation are greatly 
constrained. Since only the graduates from 
122 of the surveys were returned because of wrong 
addresses. The response rate, therefore, was 45%, 
which is similar to response rates in other surveys that 
use similar methodologies. 
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1978 and 1983 were sampled, the data set is 
restricted to a fairly well-defined age/expe- 
rience cohort. The average age of those 
sampled is 32, and 95% of the individuals 
are between 26 and 40 years old. 
The data set includes an extensive set of 
measures of human capital, firm, occupa- 
tion, and individual characteristics. Also, 
the respondents to the survey were asked to 
report the total annual pay they received 
and to disaggregate their total pay between 
base pay and contingent pay.2 
Below is a description of the variables 
used in our analysis. The discussion of the 
variables is divided into measures of pay, 
human capital, job and firm characteris- 
tics, and individual characteristics. Vari- 
able definitions and sample means, by gen- 
der, are summarized in Table 1. 
Measures of pay. The means in Table 1 
show that there is a large and statistically 
significant difference in pay between men 
and women in this sample. The mean pay 
for men is $59,597, and the mean for women 
is $45,044. Although this ratio of female to 
male pay, .76, may seem small given the 
narrow population sampled, it is consistent 
with recent survey data of the gender-pay 
ratio in professional occupations. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics figures for 1988 indicate 
that the median weekly earnings of female 
professionals and managers was 70% of the 
median weekly earnings of men. The ratio 
in sales and technical occupations was 65%. 
The base pay ratio in this sample is .87. 
Of the $14,553 gap in total pay, $6,100 is 
due to the difference in base pay. The 
contingent pay ratio is only .31. Of the gap 
in total pay, $8,467 is due to the difference 
in contingent pay. Despite the fact that 
contingent pay is a relatively small portion 
of total pay, 12% for men and 6% for women, 
the difference in contingent pay between 
2The survey asked respondents to report total di- 
rect earnings from the employer, excluding non-cash 
benefits, and also to report the components of total 
earnings, including annual salary, annual income 
from commissions, and supplementary income such 
as bonuses and profit sharing. Our measure of con- 
tingent pay is the sum of the reported commissions 
and supplementary income. 
men and women accounts for 58% of the 
difference in total pay. These raw data 
suggest that there may be important differ- 
ences between the ways in which base pay 
and contingent pay contribute to the dif- 
ferential in total pay. 
Human capital. The data set contains one 
measure of formal education and several 
measures of work experience. Sampling 
only business school graduates simplifies 
the measure of education: DEGREE is a 
dummy variable indicating whether or not 
the respondent has a graduate degree in 
business. The measures of work experi- 
ence include EXP, the total number of years 
of actual work experience, YRS, the number 
of years of work experience since gradua- 
tion from business school, and TENURE, the 
number of years with the current employer. 
Four additional measures of work expe- 
rience help qualify the more standard mea- 
sures listed above. INTERRUPTIONS iS the total 
number of months since graduation dur- 
ing which the respondentwas not employed. 
JOB CHANGES is the number of times the 
respondent changed firms since gradua- 
tion from business school. JOBS REJECTED is 
the number ofjob offers (including within- 
firm transfers or promotions) since gradu- 
ation that the individual rejected because 
the offer was not compatible with family or 
spouse needs. This variable is included to 
control for the possibility that women ac- 
cept lower rates of return on their human 
capital in order to "follow their husbands." 
The means of this variables indicate, how- 
ever, that women in this sample rejected 
fewer jobs for family-related reasons than 
did the men in the sample. This result may 
indicate that men had more jobs to reject, 
that a higher percentage of the men in the 
sample than of the women are married, or 
that married women in this age cohort are 
no longer following their husbands.3 
3This difference between men and women in the 
number of jobs rejected for family-related reasons 
also holds by marital status. The mean number ofjobs 
rejected for family reasons by married women in the 
sample is .46, whereas the mean for married men is 
.72. For single women and single men, the means are 
.17 and .5, respectively. 
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Table 1. Variable Definitions and Means of a Sample 
of 312 Business School Graduates from Two Large State Universities. 
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
Variable Definition Men Women 
TOTAL PAY = total annualjob earnings ($$) 59596 45044** 
(44445) (21848) 
BASE PAY = annual base pay ($$) 47309 41210** 
(22587) (17261) 
CONTINGENT PAY = annual pay that was contingent on job performance ($$) 12286 3819** 
(37586) (6922) 
DEGREE = 1 for master's degree and 0 for bachelor's degree .649 .514* 
(.479) (.502) 
EXP = total years of work experience 10.185 9.465 
(3.999) (4.090) 
YRS = years of work experience since graduation 7.929 7.340 
(2.650) (2.600) 
TENURE = years with current employer 5.292 4.819 
(3.720) (3.870) 
INTERRUPTIONS = number of months out of the work force since graduation 1.774 2.771 
(3.989) (5.673) 
MENTOR = amount of mentoring received between 0 and 5 2.922 3.006 
(.770) (.855) 
JOB CHANGES = number of job (firm) changes since graduation 1.375 1.472 
(1.503) (1.496) 
JOBS REJECTED = number of jobs rejected for family-related reasons .655 .354 
(1.309) (.642) 
FIRM SIZE = 0 for less than 50 employees ... 7 for more than 50,000 4.179 4.229 
(2.309) (2.317) 
INDUSTRY = 1 for manufacturing; 0 otherwise .268 .181 
(.444) (.386) 
PROFESSIONAL = 1 for professional occupation; 0 otherwise .393 .486 
(.490) (.502) 
TECHNICAL = 1 for technical occupation; 0 otherwise .071 .035 
(.258) (.184) 
SALES = 1 for sales occupation; 0 otherwise .196 .215 
(.398) (.412) 
HOURS = average weekly hours 50.804 47.938* 
(8.377) (6.444) 
MARITAL = 1 if married; 0 otherwise .750 .604* 
(.434) (.491) 
DEPENDENTS = number of dependents .857 .444* 
(1.011) (.834) 
FAMILY TIME = % of time spent with family 25.827 26.611 
(13.795) (16.492) 
SUPERVISION = number of supervisors reporting to the respondent .976 .340* 
(1.209) (.681) 
PROMOTIONS = number of promotions received since graduating 3.494 3.278 
(2.235) (1.815) 
%CONTINGENT = contingent pay/total pay .125 .062* 
(.179) (.086) 
n 168 144 
*Significant difference in means between men and women at the .05 level; **at the .01 level. 
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Finally, the data set includes a measure 
of the intensity and quality of mentoring 
received by the respondent (MENTOR). Re- 
spondents indicated the extent to which 
they had experienced various forms of 
mentoring from formally designated men- 
tors, sponsors, or influential managers since 
their graduation from business school. 
MENTOR ranges between 1 and 5, and is the 
average score on 18 items on a mentoring 
scale used in the survey.4 Since mentors 
usually aid subordinates with career devel- 
opment, involve them in networking, and 
provide them with information about the 
firm, including mentoring in the analysis 
should augment the measure of firm ten- 
ure as a proxy for the amount of firm- 
specific training the individual has received. 
Job and firm characteristics. There are 
several variables relating to the individual's 
occupation, job, and firm. FIRM SIZE is a 
measure of the number of employees in the 
respondent's firm.5 INDUSTRY is a dummy 
variable indicating whether the firm is in a 
manufacturing industry. HOURS is the aver- 
age weekly hours of work. PROFESSIONAL, 
TECHNICAL, and SALES are occupation dum- 
mies. The excluded occupation is manage- 
rial. These occupation variables constitute 
relatively narrow occupational categories, 
reflecting the fact that the population in- 
cludes only business school graduates. 
4A global measure of mentoring practices was de- 
veloped in Dreher and Ash (1990) by selecting items 
used in previous research (Noe 1988; Whitely et al. 
1988). The items were selected to cover the various 
career and psychological functions described by Kram 
(1985). When answering these questions, respon- 
dents were asked to "consider your career history 
since graduating from [your] program and the de- 
gree to which influential managers have served as 
your sponsor or mentor (this need not be limited to 
one person)." The response format ranged from a 
low of "1 = not at all" to a high of "5 = to a very large 
extent." the internal consistency (coefficient alpha) 
for the scale was .95. See Dreher and Ash (1990) for 
a more complete discussion of the mentoring vari- 
able and for a list of the 18 mentoring items used to 
calculate the measure. 
5FIRM SIZE is coded as zero for 1-49 employees; 1 for 
50-99; 2 for 100-499; 3 for 500-999; 4 for 1,000- 
4,999; 5 for 5,000-9,999; 6 for 10,000-49,999; and 7 
for 50,000+ employees. 
The data set includes two other mea- 
sures that help to control for the level of 
the individual'sjob in the firm's hierarchy. 
SUPERVISION is a measure of supervisory re- 
sponsibilities, indicating the number of 
supervisors who report to the respondent. 
It is coded 0 if no supervisors report to the 
individual; 1 if 1-2 supervisors report; 2 if 
3-5 report; 3 if 6-8 report; and 4 if 9 or 
more report. PROMOTIONS is the total num- 
ber of promotions the individual has re- 
ceived since graduation. Although these 
variables may be closely related to the hu- 
man capital measures and may proxy for 
job productivity, differences in supervisory 
responsibilities and promotions may also 
be the result of discrimination that limits 
the upward mobility of women. We have 
included these two measures in our discus- 
sion of job characteristics because they 
clearly proxy for mobility and the 
individual's level in the job hierarchy, re- 
gardless of whetherjob level is the result of 
discrimination or productivity. As ex- 
plained in the previous section, we are in- 
terested in controlling for job level even if 
job level may be determined partly by dis- 
crimination. 
Individual characteristics. This data set 
contains information about marital status 
and number of dependents. These mea- 
sures are traditionally included in analyses 
of the gender-pay gap. The data set also 
includes a measure of the time each indi- 
vidual spends with his or her family. The 
survey asked respondents to indicate what 
percentage of the total amount of time 
spent on work, recreation, and family ac- 
tivities was devoted to their family (FAMILY 
TIME). One reason for the gender-pay gap 
may be that women have more family re- 
sponsibilities than men and, therefore, 
lower levels of effort available forjob activi- 
ties (Becker 1985). The average of FAMILY 
TIME is one percentage point higher for the 
women in the sample than for the men, but 
the difference is not statistically significant. 
As mentioned above, Hersch (1991) in- 
cluded controls for household responsi- 
bilities and found that the reduction in the 
unexplained portion of the pay gap attrib- 
utable to these factors was very small. 
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Empirical Models 
For total pay and base pay, we estimate 
separately for men and women the equa- 
tion 
(1I) ln(PAYx) = B X. + e,, 
where ln(PAY) is the natural log of the pay 
variable, B is a vector of coefficients, and X 
is a vector of the human capital, job, and 
individual characteristics described above. 
We use the Blinder (1973) method for 
decomposing the pay gap for the measures 
of total pay and base pay in this sample. 
This is the standard method used for de- 
composing the pay gap between the por- 
tion of the gap due to differences between 
men and women in their endowments 
(means) of the explanatory variables and 
the portion due to differences in the rates 
of return (coefficients) to those endow- 
ments. 
The measure of contingent pay, how- 
ever, does not allow us to use a comparable 
method of analysis of the gap for this form 
of pay. Contingent pay is censored at a 
lower bound of zero. Although individuals 
can earn positive pay awards by achieving 
or exceeding specific performance stan- 
dards, compensation policies generally do 
not specify that the individual must return 
pay for failing to meet the performance 
standard. In this sample of 312 observa- 
tions, the contingent pay variable has a 
value of zero in 132 cases: 59 out of 168 
cases for men and in 73 out of 144 cases for 
women. 
Because of this censoring of the contin- 
gent pay variable, we estimate the gender 
difference in contingent pay with a stan- 
dard tobit model, using a dummy variable 
for gender. Since contingent pay is zero in 
a large number of cases, we do not take the 
normal log transformation of the pay vari- 
able. The focus of our analysis, therefore, 
is on total pay and base pay, and on how 
the unexplained portion of the pay gap 
differs between total and base pay. A 
tobit model of contingent pay is esti- 
mated simply to test whether or not the 
difference in contingent pay, holding 
other things equal, between men and 
women in this sample is statistically sig- 
nificant. 
The tobit model of contingent pay is 
specified as 
(2) PAY> B X. + b2(GENDER) + V. 
PAY. = PAY* if PAY* > 0 
=0 if PAY* < 0, 
where PAY* is the value of contingent pay 
earned, PAY. is the observed level of contin- 
gent pay, and GENDER is a dummy variable 
equal to 0 for women and 1 for men. Under 
the assumption thatv.is distributed N(0,cy2), 
we estimate the coefficients by maximizing 
a tobit likelihood function. 
OLS Results and Decomposition of the 
Differential in Total Pay and Base Pay 
OLS estimates of model (1) are presented 
in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 reports the 
results for the estimates of the total pay 
model, and the results for base pay are 
reported in Table 3. We first estimated the 
equations without the SUPERVISION and PRO- 
MOTIONS variables. In both tables, these 
results are reported in columns (1) and (2) 
for men and women, respectively. Results 
for estimates including SUPERVISION and PRO- 
MOTIONS are reported in columns (3) and 
(4). 
Of the experience and tenure variables, 
only years since graduation (YRs) is signifi- 
cant. Including quadratic terms for the 
experience and tenure variables did not 
change the results, and the quadratic terms 
were not significant. These results may be 
due to the limited range of experience in 
the sample. They may also be due to the 
other experience-related variables included 
in the equation. Interruptions in work 
experience have a significant negative ef- 
fect on both total pay and base pay. Except 
for the effect of the number ofjobs rejected 
for family reasons, the coefficients on the 
human capital variables are in the expected 
direction. The coefficients onJOBS REJECTED 
are positive for both men and women, but 
insignificant. This finding may indicate 
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Table 2. Factors Affecting Total Pay: 
OLS Results for ln(TOTAL PAY). 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable Men Women Men Women 
DEGREE .209** .200** .210** .207** 
(.074) (.058) (.073) (.057) 
EXP .0001 .012 .002 .014 
(.011) (.009) (.011) (.009) 
YRS .059** .053** .046** .039** 
(.016) (.013) (.017) (.014) 
TENURE -.005 .005 -.006 .009 
(.014) (.009) (.013) (.009) 
INTERRUPTIONS -.019* -.010* -.017 -.008 
(.009) (.005) (.009) (.005) 
MENTOR .066 .053* .047 .034 
(.045) (.031) (.045) (.032) 
JOB CHANGES -.045 -.012 -.044 -.018 
(.033) (.023) (.033) (.023) 
JOBS REJECTED .040 .028 .035 .031 
(.027) (.041) (.026) (.040) 
FIRM SIZE .009 .037** .012 .035** 
(.016) (.013) (.016) (.012) 
INDUSTRY -.040 -.028 -.070 -.026 
(.077) (.067) (.077) (.065) 
PROFESSIONAL -.026 .025 .029 .059 
(.079) (.067) (.080) (.067) 
TECHNICAL -.093 .249 -.037 .219 
(.138) (.161) (.139) (.159) 
SALES .123 .118 .187 .145 
(.094) (.079) (.097) (.079) 
HOURS .015** .015** .012** .012* 
(.004) (.005) (.004) (.005) 
MARITAL .104 .027 .134 .053 
(.099) (.062) (.099) (.061) 
DEPENDENTS .011 -.005 .005 -.010 
(.040) (.037) (.040) (.038) 
FAMILY TIME .002 -.003 .001 -.003 
(.003) (.002) (.003) (.002) 
SUPERVISION .060 .059 
(.032) (.041) 
PROMOTIONS .027 .040* 
(.017) (.017) 
CONSTANT 9.181** 8.966** 9.239** 9.027** 
(.309) (.261) (.306) (.260) 
R2 .349 .580 .379 .604 
Adj. R2 .275 .523 .299 .543 
SEE .413 .294 .406 .288 
n 168 144 168 144 
*Statistically significant at the .05 level; **at the 
.01 level (2-tailed tests). 
thatJoBs REJECTED is measuring job mobility 
(more offers to move) rather than job im- 
mobility due to family ties. 
The results on the individual character- 
istics are consistent with findings of other 
studies. The coefficients on marital status 
are positive in each specification, and in 
each case the coefficient for men is larger 
than that for women. In most of the speci- 
fications the coefficient on the family-time 
variable is positive but insignificant for men. 
The results are negative and significant for 
women in the total pay equation that in- 
cludes SUPERVISION and PROMOTIONS, and 
negative and significant for women in both 
base pay equations. 
The coefficients on the SUPERVISION and 
PROMOTION variables are positive for men 
and women in both the total pay and base 
pay equations. The coefficients on the 
PROMOTION variable are significant in each 
case. The coefficients on the SUPERVISION 
variable are significant at the 10% level for 
men and not quite significant for women. 
Despite the fact that the data set is small 
and was drawn from a relatively narrow 
segment of the work force, the results are 
consistent, more or less, with expectations 
based on previous studies. Furthermore, 
the results for the total pay model are very 
similar to those for the base pay model. 
Following Blinder (1973), we decompose 
the estimated pay gap into the effects of 
differences in means and differences in 
coefficients. We calculate and report the 
unadjusted pay ratio and the adjusted pay 
ratio. The adjusted pay ratio is calculated 
using the expected female pay evaluated at 
the male means of the independent vari- 
ables. We also calculate the percentage of 
the gap attributable to differences in means, 
and the percentage of the gap attributable 
to differences in coefficients.6 The per- 
6See Cain (1986) and Blau and Ferber (1987) for 
a careful discussion of this decomposition method 
and a review of the discrimination literature in which 
this analysis has been applied. 
The expected pay gap between men and women 
based on the regression results is calculated as 
Pay gap = IBiM(X- -X X) + 12Xi(Bim -Bi), 
where B. is the estimated coefficient for the ith vari- 
able and X. is the mean of the ith variable from the 
OLS estimates reported in Tables 2 and 3. The fand 
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centage of the gap due to coefficients is the 
"unexplained" portion of the pay gap. If 
the estimated models of pay have fully con- 
trolled for productivity factors, then this 
unexplained percentage of the gap is a 
measure of discrimination. As mentioned 
above, the unexplained portion of the pay 
gap is a lower bound estimate of the effects 
of discrimination when endogenous vari- 
ables that have likely been affected by wage 
discrimination are used in the analysis. 
The results of the decomposition for 
both the total pay and base pay models are 
reported in Table 5. The values from the 
decomposition have been calculated using 
both the male coefficients and the female 
coefficients. Results using the female coef- 
ficients are reported in parentheses below 
the values based on the male coefficients. 
According to the results in Table 5, there 
is a large difference in the unexplained gap 
in pay between the total pay and base pay 
models. When human capital, firm, occu- 
pation, and individual characteristics are 
included in the estimate of total pay, the 
pay ratio, adjusted for differences in means, 
is .88. When controls for supervisory re- 
sponsibilities and number of promotions 
are included, the adjusted ratio increases 
to .91. The percentage of the gap in total 
pay that is attributable to differences in 
coefficients is 44% and 34% in those re- 
spective specifications. Given the narrow 
sample used and the number of controls in 
the equation, including controls for occu- 
pation, supervisory responsibilities, and 
promotions, a 9-12% gap in pay that is 
attributable to differences in coefficients is 
large and represents a significant economic 
m subscripts denote the female and male equations, 
respectively. The first term in the equation is the 
difference in pay due to differences between the male 
and female means, and the second term is the differ- 
ence in pay due to differences between the male and 
female coefficients. Cain (1986) showed that the 
decomposed values depend on the choice of whether 
the male coefficients or the female coefficients are 
used as the basis of the decomposition. Based on the 
assumption that the male equation represents the 
prevailing rate at which endowments would be com- 
pensated if market discrimination were eliminated, it 
is the convention to decompose the pay gap using the 
male coefficients. 
Table 3. Factors Affecting Base Pay: 
OLS Results for ln(BASE PAY). 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable Men Women Men Women 
DEGREE .195** .211** .201 ** .215** 
(.065) (.052) (.062) (.051) 
EXP .008 .012 .011 .014 
(.010) (.008) (.009) (.008) 
YRS .046** .050** .026 .035** 
(.014) (.012) (.014) (.013) 
TENURE -.002 .0004 -.003 .005 
(.012) (.0084) (.011) (.008) 
INTERRUPTIONS -.017* -.009* -.013 -.007 
(.008) (.004) (.008) (.004) 
MENTOR .024 .031 -.003 .011 
(.039) (.028) (.038) (.028) 
JOB CHANGES -.066* -.018 -.066* -.023 
(.029) (.021) (.028) (.020) 
JOBS REJECTED .024 .033 .017 .036 
(.023) (.037) (.022) (.036) 
FIRM SIZE .003 .033** .007 .031** 
(.014) (.011) (.013) (.011) 
INDUSTRY .069 -.043 .025 -.041 
(.068) (.060) (.066) (.058) 
PROFESSIONAL .027 .009 .089 .042 
(.069) (.060) (.069) (.060) 
TECHNICAL .035 .253 .088 .216 
(.121) (.144) (.118) (.142) 
SALES -.036 .045 .028 .067 
(.083) (.071) (.083) (.070) 
HOURS .014** .013** .011** .010* 
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
MARITAL .101 .020 .148 .045 
(.087) (.056) (.084) (.055) 
DEPENDENTS -.033 -.003 -.045 -.004 
(.036) (.033) (.034) (.034) 
FAMILY TIME .0002 -.003 -.0005 -.004* 
(.0026) (.002) (.0025) (.002) 
SUPERVISION -.052 .048 
(.027) (.036) 
PROMOTIONS -.046** .043** 
(.014) (.015) 
CONSTANT 9.352** 9.177** 9.390** 9.251** 
(.271) (.234) (.261) (.231) 
R2 .347 .579 .412 .609 
Adj. R2 .273 .523 .336 .550 
SEE .362 .264 .346 .257 
n 168 144 168 144 
*Statistically significant at the .05 level; **at the 
.01 level (2-tailed tests). 
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Table 4. OLS Results for in (TOTAL PAY), Controlling for the Percentage of Contingent Pay. 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
Variable Men Women Variable Men Women 
DEGREE .189** .217** SALES -.009 .029 
(.057) (.050) (.078) (.072) 
EXP .007 .013 HOURS .011** .008* 
(.008) (.008) (.003) (.004) 
YRS .031 * .032* MARITAL .166* .049 
(.013) (.013) (.077) (.054) 
TENURE .001 .003 DEPENDENTS -.037 -.002 
(.011) (.008) (.032) (.033) 
INTERRUPTIONS -.013 -.006 FAMILY TIME -.0003 -.004* 
(.007) (.004) (.0023) (.002) 
MENTOR .008 -.003 SUPERVISION .043 .041 
(.035) (.029) (.025) (.036) 
JOB CHANGES -.046 -.027 PROMOTIONS .039** .044** 
(.026) (.020) (.013) (.015) 
JOBS REJECTED .013 .037 %CONTINGENT 1.511** 1.772** 
(.021) (.035) (.154) (.284) 
FIRM SIZE .013 .028* CONSTANT 9.346** 9.380** 
(.012) (.011) (.239) (.234) 
INDUSTRY -.013 -.049 
(.060) (.057) R2 .624 .699 
PROFESSIONAL .055 .039 Adj. R2 .573 .650 
(.063) (.059) SEE .317 .252 
TECHNICAL .051 .216 
(.109) (.139) n 168 144 
*Statistically significant at the .05 level; **at the .01 level (2-tailed tests). 
difference in pay. This finding, however, is 
very consistent with other studies of the 
gender-pay gap that carefully control for 
occupation or estimate the pay gap using 
occupation-specific data sets. Cain (1986), 
for example, listed four studies controlling 
for detailed occupations, and the adjusted 
pay ratios in those studies ranged from .86 
to .93. 
The decomposition of the results from 
the base pay models is very different. When 
SUPERVISION and PROMOTIONS are not included 
in the base pay regressions, the adjusted 
pay ratio is .98, almost unity. Only 13% of 
the unadjusted pay gap is due to differ- 
ences in coefficients. When SUPERVISION 
and PROMOTIONS are included in the esti- 
mates, the adjusted pay ratio is 1.0. As we 
pointed out above, this result does not mean 
that the estimate of discrimination in base 
pay is zero. At best, this is a lower bound 
estimate of discrimination in base pay, since 
we have controlled for variables that may 
be the result of discrimination. The values 
of SUPERVISION, PROMOTIONS, the occupation 
variables, MENTOR, TENURE, and possibly other 
variables may result from discrimination. 
In fact, given that differences in base pay 
are determined mostly by level ofjob in the 
hierarchy, we would expect a model of base 
pay that includes variables reflecting job 
level to explain the gender differences in 
base pay. 
The most interesting result in Table 5 is 
the difference between the decompositions 
of the total pay and base pay estimates. 
Although the unexplained portion of the 
gap in base pay varies between zero and 2% 
in the two different specifications of the 
model, controlling for the same variables 
leaves a 9-12% unexplained gap in total 
pay. Since the remaining 9% gap in total 
pay cannot be accounted for by the vari- 
ables that account for all of the gender 
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Table 5. Decomposition of Gender-Pay Differentials by Model and Type of Pay. 
Pay Ratio 
Total Pay Base Pay 
Un- Meansc Coeffd Un- Meansc Coeffd 
Modela adjusted Adjusted' (%) (%) adjusted Adjustedb (%) (%) 
(1) HUMAN CAPITAL, 
FIRM/OCCUPATION, and .77 .88 56 44 .86 .98 87 13 
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS (.84) (51) (49) (.98) (84) (16) 
(2) HUMAN CAPITAL, 
FIRM/OCCUPATION, INDIVIDUAL 
CHARACTERISTICS, SUPERVISION, .78 .91 66 34 .87 1.00 103 -3 
and PROMOTION (.91) (65) (35) (1.01) (108) (-8) 
(3) HUMAN CAPITAL, 
FIRM/OCCUPATION, INDIVIDUAL 
CHARACTERISTICS, SUPERVISION, 
PROMOTION, and .78 .99 97 3 
% CONTINGENT PAY (1.01) (106) (-6) 
Note: Male coefficients are used as the basis of the decomposition. Results using female coefficients are 
reported in parentheses. 
aModel (1) is based on the results from equations (1) and (2) in Tables 2 and 3 for Total Pay and Base Pay, 
respectively. Model (2) is based on the results from equations (3) and (4), and model (3) is based on the results 
reported in Table 4. 
bPay ratio after adjusting for differences in means of explanatory variables. 
cPercentage of pay difference due to difference in means of explanatory variables. 
dPercentage of pay difference due to difference in coefficients of explanatory variables. 
difference in base pay, this 9% gap in total 
pay must be due to gender differences in 
contingent pay. 
To test within the same analytic frame- 
work whether or not the remaining 9% gap 
in total pay is due to differences in contin- 
gent pay, we re-estimated the total pay model 
holding constant the proportion of total 
pay that was earned in the form of contin- 
gent pay (%CONTINGENT). The regression 
results from this estimation are reported in 
Table 4. The results of the decomposition 
of these estimates are reported in the third 
row of results in Table 5. 
When %CONTINGENT is included in the 
estimate of total pay, the adjusted pay ratio 
increases from .91 to .99 (Table 5). The 
results of this decomposition are very simi- 
lar to the previous results from the base pay 
model. Controlling for contingent pay, 
there is basically no evidence of a gender 
gap in total pay. This finding is consistent 
with the hypothesis that the unexplained 
9% gap in total pay, which we observe when 
controlling for human capital, job level, 
and other factors, is due to gender differ- 
ences in contingent pay. 
Tobit Results 
Results from the estimates of the tobit 
model of contingent pay are presented in 
Table 6. Estimates of the level of contin- 
gent pay as the dependent variable are 
reported in columns (1) and (2), and esti- 
mates of contingent pay as a proportion of 
total pay are reported in columns (3) and 
(4). The gender pay difference is esti- 
mated here by including a GENDER dummy 
variable equal to 0 for women and 1 for 
men. 
The coefficient on GENDER iS positive and 
significant even when we control for job 
level variables. This result holds for both 
the level of contingent pay and contingent 
pay as a proportion of total pay. Although 
we cannot compare these results directly to 
the OLS estimates or decompose the tobit 
estimates, these results support the find- 
ings above that indicate a significant differ- 
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Table 6. Tobit Coefficients for 
Contingent Pay Models. 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
Contingent Pay! 
Contingent Pay Total Pay 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DEGREE 6759 6723 .021 .020 
(5422) (5422) (.027) (.027) 
EXP -385 -365 -.002 -.002 
(867) (871) (.004) (.004) 
YRS 2689* 2649* .010 .012 
(1220) (1321) (.006) (.007) 
TENURE -436 -482 -.002 -.003 
(970) (976) (.005) (.005) 
INTERRUPTIONS -590 -585 -.004 -.005 
(571) (575) (.003) (.003) 
MENTOR 7141* 7157* .039* .043** 
(3149) (3234) (.016) (.016) 
JOB CHANGES -121 -180 .003 .002 
(2380) (2381) (.012) (.012) 
JOBS REJECTED 3294 3244 .019 .020 
(2228) (2232) (.011) (.011) 
FIRM SIZE 1063 1120 .003 .003 
(1178) (1181) (.006) (.006) 
INDUSTRY -1242 -1287 -.004 -.001 
(5736) (5782) (.029) (.029) 
PROFESSIONAL -3818 -2991 -.003 .001 
(5995) (6149) (.030) (.031) 
TECHNICAL -15390 -14284 -.087 -.078 
(12602) (12717) (.064) (.064) 
SALES 12173 13459 .157** .166** 
(6677) (6959) (.034) (.035) 
HOURS 660 580 .003 .003 
(335) (356) (.002) (.002) 
MARITAL -2588 -2386 -.022 -.025 
(6393) (6458) (.032) (.033) 
DEPENDENTS 1899 17587 .025 .024 
(3164) (3173) (.016) (.016) 
FAMILY TIME 194 184 .001 .001 
(206) (207) (.001) (.001) 
SUPERVISION - 1758 - .014 
(2627) (.013) 
PROMOTIONS - -87 - -.007 
(1349) (.007) 
GENDER 12826* 12019* .083** .077** 
(5200) (5335) (.026) (.027) 
Scalea 37095 37086 .191 .190 
(2005) (2005) (.011) (.011) 
CONSTANT -96530**-95145** -.422** -.414** 
(23524) (23614) (.119) (.119) 
Log-likelihood -2219 -2219 -40.98 -39.95 
n 312 312 312 312 
*Statistically significant at the .05 level; **at the .01 
level (2-tailed tests). 
aIn the tobit equation the error term is scaled by an 
unknown parameter. 
The coefficient reported here is the estimate of the 
scale parameter. 
ence in contingent pay between the men 
and women in this sample. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
We have analyzed the gender-pay gap by 
form of pay using new data from a survey of 
business school graduates. We take a new 
approach to the analysis of the gender-pay 
gap. Rather than focusing on the right- 
hand-side variables in the earnings equa- 
tion, we examine the pay gap by type of pay. 
The principal finding of the analysis is 
that a significant portion of the gap in total 
pay is due to differences in that part of total 
pay that is contingent on job performance. 
The gender difference in contingent pay 
accounts for 58% of the $14,500 gender 
difference in average total pay in the sample; 
gender differences in base pay account for 
only 42%. When human capital, individual 
characteristics, and occupation andjob level 
are controlled for, it appears that approxi- 
mately 34% of the unadjusted gap in total 
pay that is not explained by gender differ- 
ences in endowments is due to gender dif- 
ferences in contingent pay. We believe 
these results are interesting and informa- 
tive about a dimension of the gender-pay 
gap that has previously received very little 
attention. 
This study has some clear limitations. 
Because the data set is small and was drawn 
from a rather narrow segment of the popu- 
lation, we cannot extrapolate the results 
from this study to the entire population. 
The results from the estimates of the total- 
pay model, however, are consistent with 
results from studies that rely on broader 
and larger samples and include controls 
for narrowly defined occupations. 
Although we stated no predictions con- 
cerning the relationship between the gen- 
der-pay gap and the form of pay, we will 
here explore several possible explanations 
of the findings. The large within-job differ- 
ence in contingent pay estimated in this 
data set, controlling for those factors that 
explain all of the differences in base pay, 
might occur within firms or across firms. 
Since we do not have a control for the firm 
in this study, we cannot test whether this is 
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a within-firm or across-firm effect. Possible 
explanations for the within-job'difference 
in contingent pay vary, however, depend- 
ing on where the difference occurs. 
If gender differences in contingent pay, 
within jobs, occur within firms, the causes 
must be one or more of the following. First, 
firms may not offer men and women equal 
opportunities to gain contingent pay. Sec- 
ond, men and women may be treated dif- 
ferently injob performance evaluations that 
are used to determine contingent pay. And 
third, there may be differences between 
men and women in their marginal levels of 
job performance. One of these causes or 
some combination of them would explain a 
within-firm, within-job, difference in con- 
tingent pay. 
Given the findings of previous studies, 
however, we believe that the observed dif- 
ference in contingent pay more likely oc- 
curs across firms than within firms. As 
mentioned above, previous studies in which 
controls for the firm are included have 
found that within narrowly defined occu- 
pations, gender differences in pay occur 
across firms rather than within firms (for 
example, Blau 1975; Groshen 199 1). These 
studies have found that withinjobs, women 
are disproportionately represented in lower- 
paying firms. If the difference found in this 
study occurs across firms, then otherwise 
equally qualified women must be more likely 
to be employed in firms with lower levels of 
contingent pay. To explain why women are 
over-represented in firms with lower levels 
of contingent pay, we must focus on the 
sorting mechanisms that cause this particu- 
lar distribution of employment. It is pos- 
sible, for example, that firms that rely on 
contingent pay incentive mechanisms also 
use recruitment, selection, and career de- 
velopment mechanisms that sort women 
out of the jobs providing opportunities for 
high levels of contingent pay. 
Finally, one possible explanation for the 
findings in this study is that women prefer 
less pay risk than do men and they are more 
likely than men to choose those occupa- 
tions and firms, everything else being equal, 
that offer compensation plans with less varia- 
tion in pay between pay periods. At least 
part of the observed difference in total pay 
between men and women, therefore, may 
reflect a premium to men for bearing more 
of the risk of short-run variations in their 
job performance than, on average, women 
bear. This interpretation of the results is 
consistent with the findings of Subich et al. 
(1989) that women are less willing to take 
risks in the job market than are men. Fur- 
ther support for this conclusion can be 
found in studies comparing the risk-taking 
behavior of men and women within specific 
jobs and occupations. Muldrow and Bayton 
(1979) compared several dimensions of the 
decision making process of male and fe- 
male executives and found that the deci- 
sions of the women in the study were sig- 
nificantly less risky than were those of the 
men. Sexton and Bowman-Upton (1991) 
tested the psychological traits of male and 
female entrepreneurs whose firms were of 
similar size. Among the very few differ- 
ences that were found between the men 
and the women tested was a significantly 
higher score on risk aversion for the women. 
This interpretation is also consistent with 
the- findings of Dreher and Ash (1990). 
Using the same data set we have used, and 
controlling for many of the same individual, 
firm, and job characteristics held constant 
in our analysis, Dreher and Ash found that 
the men and women in this sample were 
equally satisfied with their level of pay de- 
spite the significant difference in total pay.7 
One problem with this explanation is 
that if the difference represents a risk pre- 
mium, then we would expect base pay to be 
lower for men than for women. Our find- 
ings indicate that, all else equal, base pay is 
equal. The results for the decomposition 
of the difference in base pay reported in 
Table 5, based on the model controlling for 
promotions and supervisory responsibili- 
ties, do indicate, however, that the coeffi- 
cients have a positive effect on women's pay 
relative to men's pay. The coefficient ef- 
fect is -3%, meaning that 3% of the differ- 
ential in base pay cannot be explained by 
7Dreher and Ash looked only at total pay in their 
analysis of pay satisfaction. 
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differences in means, and that this unex- 
plained 3% favors women's pay. Although 
the direction of this coefficient effect would 
be consistent with men accepting lower 
base pay in exchange for higher (and 
riskier) expected returns on contingent 
pay, 3% of the unadjusted difference is 
too small to be meaningful in an eco- 
nomic sense. Given such a small differ- 
ence in base pay, we would expect even 
highly risk-averse workers to be willing to 
choose firms using contingent pay mecha- 
nisms. 
Obviously, the reason why such a large 
part of the unexplained gender difference 
in total pay can be accounted for by the 
gender difference in contingent pay is not 
clear. Regardless of whether the difference 
is due to risk preferences, it is clear that 
within this sample most of the unexplained 
difference in pay, withinjobs, is due to that 
part of pay that is at risk. This finding poses 
important questions for future research. 
First, does the relationship observed here 
between the gender-pay gap and contin- 
gent pay hold within other narrowly de- 
fined occupations? Second, does this rela- 
tionship hold for differences in pay that 
occur across occupations? Finally, do dif- 
ferences in risk preferences between men 
and women explain any of the pay differ- 
ence? -And if so, to what extent is this 
difference in taste caused by pre-market 
socialization and education processes, or 
by women's response to their treatment in 
the labor market or how they expect to be 
treated there? A better understanding of 
why differences in contingent pay can ac- 
count for so much of the difference in total 
pay is necessary in order to determine how 
labor market policy can or cannot affect 
the gender-pay gap. 
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